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JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY TRENDS IN THE
LAW OF ADOPTION
SANFORD N. KATZ*
In this analysis of the recent developments in American adoption laws,
the author emphasizes the complexity of the adoption process and its tradi-
tional concern for the welfare of the child. Utilizing the model adoption
legislation recently drafted by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare as a guide, Professor Katz indicates that the modern tendency is
toward greater recognition of the need for safeguarding the interests of all
of the parties to an adoption proceeding.
INTRODUCTION
Today, adoption is not only the juridical act creating certain civil rela-
tions between two persons; it is also a social process. The social implica-
tions are based upon the fact that the history of adoption in the United
States is part of the history of child welfare and particularly of the treat-
ment of the dependent child.' Because of this emphasis on the child
and his well-being, in recent years the American approach has placed
continually greater emphasis upon the interrelationship between the legal
and the social problems involved in this area.
With this in mind, this article will undertake to analyze some of the
similarities and differences between adoption laws in the United States,
using, as a point of reference, a single modern statute thought to be a
guide to enlightened legislation-An Act for the Adoption of Children,2
drafted by the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare. Throughout the course of this article
reference will also be made to the Act's companion statute, An Act for
Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship; 3 for the drafters of the
Model Adoption Act envisioned a "package plan"--4.e., that states
would adopt the Model Adoption Act and the Model Termination Act
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Law School, Catholic University of America; A.B.,
Boston University; J.D., University of Chicago.
I See Thurston, The Dependent Child (1930). For an interesting account of the treat-
ment of orphans and adopted children in nineteenth century America see Clothier, Some
Aspects of the Problem of Adoption, 9 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 598 (1939).
2 Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Legislative Guides
for the Termination of Parental Rights and Responsibilities and the Adoption of Children
49 (1961) [hereinafter referred to as the Model Adoption Act (MAA)].
3 Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 37 [hereinafter referred to as the Model Termination Act (MTA)].
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together. Finally, in discussing these two acts in relation to the existing
law of the different states, some attempt will be made to evaluate and
compare the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the various posi-
tions. By so doing, it is hoped that all the considerations, both social and
legal, which surround the adoption proceeding will be brought to the
attention of all those concerned with this important area of the law.
PREREQUISITES TO ADOPTION
Before discussing the substantive problems involved in an adoption, it
seems necessary to turn our attention to the preliminary matter of pre-
requisites to the adoption proceeding. Especially important are two pre-
requisites which have been advocated over the years.4 These are (1) that
in a nonrelative adoption, the placement must be made by a licensed
social service agency, and (2) that a judicial proceeding to terminate the
rights of the natural parents in the child must antedate the petition for
adoption. It is in satisfying these prerequisites that the Model Adoption
Act and its companion statute best exemplify the meeting of the realms of
law and the social sciences.
THE REQUIREMENT OF AGENCY PLACEMENTS
Turning to the first of the above-mentioned requirements, section 6
of the Model Adoption Act provides that except for the related adoption5
no adoption petition will be entertained unless "the child sought to be
adopted has [first] been placed for adoption with the petitioners by a
child placement agency." This type of "agency placement" is to be con-
trasted with a private or independent placement. That kind of placement
is exemplified by the private placing of a child by a physician where the
physician knows that one of his patients, an unmarried mother, for ex-
ample, wants to give up her child for adoption and that another of his
patients wishes to adopt a child. His arranging the adoption without
resorting to a social service agency for study and investigation would be
an independent adoption, or, as it is sometimes called a "private place-
ment."
The dangers inherent in this latter type are clear and for this reason
4 See, e.g., Poller, Parental Rights-The Need for Law and Social Action (1958);
Stevenson, King, Verry & Gallagher, Current Problems in Child Adoption, 24 Postgraduate
Medicine 526-28 (1958).
5 A related adoption is usually accomplished without agency involvement at the petition-
ling stage.
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such" unregulated adoptions have been widely criticized on the grounds
that they foster "black market" adoptions, that they can be arranged for
profit,7 and that they can leave both the adoptive and the natural parents
unprotected.' Aside from these criticisms, there is the equally important
consideration that even "a lawyer who is well equipped to handle the legal
aspects of adoption may not be qualified to decide many questions in-
cluded in placing a child which properly lie within the realm of specialized
social knowledge."9 It is this element of "specialized social knowledge"
which, though an advantage of great importance, is generally lacking in
independent adoptions, and which section 6 of the Model Adoption Act
is designed to secure.
The advantages of agency placement are also seen in an investigation
of the services provided by such agencies. As intimated previously, the
purpose of such services is both to promote the well-being of the child
to be adopted, and also to recognize the needs and interests of both the
natural and the adoptive parents. The services to the child would take
the form of making a study of the child which would include his develop-
ment history, his family history, and a medical and psychological examina-
tion. In addition, the child would be placed in the home of a suitable
adoptive family under the supervision of the agency.
Similarly, with regard to the natural parents, casework help would be
given to arrive at a decision regarding relinquishment of the child. For
example, a social worker would discuss plans for the child, the problem
of confidentiality, and preference for the religious upbringing of the
child. And if the natural parent is an unmarried mother, specialized serv-
ices' would be provided because of the existing social disadvantages for
her and her child. Services to the adoptive parents would consist of case-
work help, protection, the selection of a child suitable for them if their
home can be used, and assistance in completion of legal adoption and
6 See, e.g., Reid, The Role of the Social Agency in Adoption, 20 Pediatrics 369 (1957);
Stevenson, King, Verry & Gallagher, supra note 4, at 522, 524-25; Comment, Moppets on
the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoption, 59 Yale L.J. 715, 729-30 (1950).
7 Hearings on juvenile Delinquency Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on the judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5, 192-99 (1955); Laufer, Family Law, 34 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1550, 1551 (1959).
8 There are, of course, risks in agency-placed adoptions. These risks are not legal ones,
however, but simply the ordinary risks inherent in every adoption-e.g., the possibility
that the child might not develop normally and might not be fully integrated into the family.
Whether such risks are less in agency placements than in private placements is not certain.
9 Hearings on juvenile Delinquency, supra note 7, at 3 (remarks of Senator Kefauver).
(Emphasis added.)
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post-adoption counseling. These services would also have the valuable
by-product of aiding the court in making the best disposition of the case
by providing it with carefully drawn reports and recommendations pre-
pared by trained social workers.
The position taken by the Model Adoption Act in seeking to secure the
advantages of such "specialized social knowledge" to the child and his
natural and adoptive parents is also found in several existing state
statutes. Thus, in Connecticut and Delaware the courts are prohibited
from entering a decree of adoption for any child not related to the
petitioners in some way, unless the placement has been made by a
licensed child welfare agency.10 Likewise, in recent years it has been
the practice in many American jurisdictions that before an adoption is
decreed, the court must order a study made of the child, his natural
parents, and his adoptive parents." This position, it is suggested, repre-
sents a forward step in the history of American adoption laws, and a
logical development of the American courts' traditional concern for the
welfare of the child.
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
In regard to the second prerequisite, it clearly appears in the best
interests of the child and his natural and adoptive parents that an in-
formal court proceeding to terminate parental rights and responsibilities
in the child precede the actual adoption, and that the termination decree
provide for guardianship and for legal custody of the child. The tradi-
tional relinquishment or release to a social service agency can cause
considerable legal and psychological difficulties. The reciprocal rights,
privileges, duties, and obligations of parents and child are uncertain.
The child's status is questionable and the agency's area of function is
unclear. It is the purpose of the Model Termination Act to alleviate this
10 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 45-63 (1958) ; Del. Code Ann- tit. 13, § 904 (1953).
11 There is some variation among the jurisdictions as to whether such an investigation
should be mandatory or discretionary. E.g., in New York, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §§ 112(5),
113, 115-a(3), 116(2)-(3), and Illinois, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-6 (1961), it is mandatory;
while in Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann. § 1269-05 (1956), and Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 127.210(4) (1959), it is discretionary. The District of Columbia makes the investigation
mandatory unless the petitioner is a spouse of a natural parent of the adoptee, which
natural parent consents to the adoption or joins in the adoption petition, in which case the
investigation is discretionary. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-216 (1961). Other jurisdictions treat
this problem in still different ways. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 76 (1957) (mandatory
except where the court "has such intimate and personal knowledge of the facts and circum-
stances" as to render an investigation unnecessary).
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uncertainty by providing for voluntary and involuntary "severance of the
parent-child relationship and supervision by judicial process which will
safeguard the rights and interest of all parties concerned .... "'
In a voluntary termination proceeding, a petition to terminate may
be filed either directly by a parent or through an authorized agency."l
A petition to involuntarily terminate the parent-child relationship may be
filed in any one of five ways: (1) by either parent when termination of
the parent-child relationship is sought with respect to the other; (2) by
the guardian of the person or the legal custodian of the child; (3) by the
person standing in loco parentis to the child; (4) by an authorized
agency; or (5) by any other person having a legitimate interest in the
matter.14 Grounds for such an involuntary termination are: abandon-
ment; substantial and continuous or repeated neglect; incapacity to
discharge parental responsibilities; or that the presumptive parent is not
a natural parent of the child.15
If the court terminates the parent-child relationship, it will appoint
an individual as guardian of the child's person, or appoint one individual
as guardian of the child's person and vest legal custody in another in-
dividual or in an authorized agency-or where it is alleged in the
petition that the termination is sought in contemplation of adoption, it
will appoint an official of an authorized agency as guardian of the child's
person and will vest legal custody in that agency." If the court does not
terminate the parent-child relationship, an order placing the child under
protective supervision for a temporary period, or vesting legal custody
for a time in an authorized agency, may nonetheless be made if the best
interests of the child so require; this order is also to fix the responsibility
for child support, and to certify the case to an appropriate court for any
necessary further action.17 The effect of the termination decree is thus
to divest the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and
obligations, including rights of inheritance, with respect to each other.'8
Termination acts have been criticized on the ground that they fail to
provide adequate safeguards for the rights of the natural parents.) The
12 MTA § 1.
13 MTA § 4(a).
'4 MTA § 4(c).
15 MTA § 4(b).
16 MTA § 9(l).
17 MTA § 9.
18 MTA § 10.
-1 See, e.g., Note, Termination of Parental Rights to Free Child for Adoption, 32 N.Y.U.
Rev. 579, 589-91 (1957).
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Model Termination Act, however, makes an earnest effort to safeguard
these rights, insofar as it is consistent with the rights of the other parties
involved. Thus, fair and reasonable requirements are laid out for the
notification of the natural parents; the parents are entitled to be repre-
sented by counsel at the termination hearing; if they are financially un-
able to procure the services of counsel themselves, counsel will be pro-
vided; and a preponderance of the evidence, under the rules applicable
to the trial of civil cases, is necessary to establish any of the grounds for
involuntary termination.2"
The complaint might also be made that the Model Termination Act
permits hearsay evidence to be introduced at the termination hearing-
for Section 8 of that Act provides that relevant and material information
of any nature, including that contained in reports, studies, or examina-
tions, may be admitted and relied upon to the extent of its probative
value. It must be remembered, however, that the hearing is to be before
a judge, not a jury, and it seems unlikely that the judge would give such
information more than its due probative weight. Moreover, a termina-
tion hearing differs from a criminal or civil trial as it does not seek to
penalize anyone, by searching for the presence of guilt or liability. A
termination hearing seeks above all else the welfare of the child, with due
regard for the rights of the natural and adoptive parents; and it may well
be that this ideal can best be achieved in a hearing characterized by in-
formality and confidentiality, freed from strict compliance with the rules
of evidence.
II
WHO MAY ADOPT; WHO MAY BE ADOPTED-iN GENERAL
In any discussion of the substantive law of adoption the first questions
which logically arise are "Who may adopt?" and "Who may be adopted?"
In this area the Model Adoption Act is fairly typical of the statutes in
many states,21 and of the Uniform Adoption Act as well.22 It provides
that any child may be adopted who is in the state at the time the petition
for adoption is filed,2 3 and that husband and wife may jointly adopt a
child, or if one of the spouses is already the child's parent, the other
20 MTA § 8.
21 A table showing the characteristic features of American adoption laws can be found
in Note, 38 Va. L. Rev. 544, 552-53 (1952).
22 Uniform Adoption Act §§ 2-3. Two states, Montana and Oklahoma, have enacted the
Uniform Act. Mont. Rev Codes Ann. §§ 61-201 to -217 (1962); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10,
§§ 60.1-.23 (Supp. 1962).
23 MAA § 3.
1962]
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may separately adopt him. An individual may also adopt a child where
such individual is an unmarried adult, or a married adult who has been
accorded the right to reside separate and apart from his or her spouse by
judicial decree. 4 In this respect, however, the Model Adoption Act does
not completely follow the Uniform Adoption Act2" in that it does not
include in the category of individuals eligible to adopt a child an un-
married mother or father, regardless of age.
While the overall position taken by the Model Adoption Act is basically
sound, its wisdom in rejecting the Uniform Act's treatment of the un-
married minor parent is subject. to certain doubts. It might have been
wise to include the Uniform Act's provision making the unmarried minor
parent of a child a suitable person to adopt him. One can imagine a
situation where the mother of an illegitimate child dies in childbirth, and
the father, a minor, would like to adopt the child; or it might be that
an unmarried' father of an illegitimate child entering military service
would want to adopt 'the child, in order to bestow all the benefits which
might accrue to him upon his child. As the Model Adoption Act now
reads, if the father of the illegitimate child is an adult, or if he is a
minor married even to a person other than the mother of the child, he
could qualify under section 4(a) or section 4(b). But if he is a minor
and unmarried, he could not qualify under the Act.
RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS
In neither sections 3 (Who May Be Adopted), 4 (Who May Adopt),
nor 7 (Petition) of the Model Adoption Act is there any reference to the
religion of the child or of the adoptive parents. Perhaps this aspect of
adoption law was considered a policy matter, rather than a legislative
one; or, perhaps, since under the Model Adoption Act a prerequisite to an
adoption is placement by a licensed social service agency, it was intended
that this matter Should be considered at the placement stage.
The Child Welfare League of America, however, has taken the follow-
ing position on religion and adoption:
A child should ordinarily be placed in a home where the religion of adoptive
parents is the same as that of the child, unless the parents have specified that
the child should or may be placed with a family of another religion. Every effort
(including interagency and interstate referrals) should be made to place the
child within his own faith, or that designated by his parents. If however such
matching means that placement might never be feasible, or involves a substantial
24 M AA § 4.
25 Uniform Adoption Act § 3(4).
(Vol. 51: p. 64
LAW OF ADOPTION
delay in placement or placement in a less suitable home, a child's need for a
permanent family of his own requires that consideration should then be given to
placing the child in a home of a different religion. For *children whose religion
is not known, and whose parents are not accessible, the most suitable home
available should be selected.26
Similarly, many states are concerned with the religion of the child and
of his natural and adoptive parents, and consider this aspect of the
"matching process" in their statutes. In some states the religious affilia-
tions of the parties concerned must be placed on the petition or must be
considered in the disposition of the case 2 7 In others there are provisions
regarding the placement of the adoptive child in the custody of adoptive
parents whose religious affiliation is the same as the child's. These pro-
visions are typically qualified by the words "when practicable,"28 or
26 Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Adoption Service 25 (1958). The
quoted statement is in accord with the beliefs underlying practices in a high proportion of
nonsectarian agencies, and with those represented by athe Council of Jewish Federation and
Welfare Funds and by the Department of Social Welfare, National Council of Churches
of Christ in the United States. But Catholic adoption agencies are committed to "the basic
principle that any Catholic child being placed for adoption can have his total needs met
only in a Catholic adoptive home." Bowers, The Child's Heritage-From a Catholic Point
of View, in 2 A Study of Adoption Practice 130 (Schapiro ed. 1956). This position is based
on the Catholic viewpoint that "religion is something more than a value to the child. It is
also an obligation basic to his very nature." Id. at 130-31. However, the practice of Catholic
adoption agencies varies somewhat where applicants representing a marriage between a
Catholic and a non-Catholic are concerned. Some Catholic agencies, will consider such
applications, particularly "in instances where the mother is Catholic or in families in which
the non-Catholic party is willing to take instructions in the fundamental teachings of the
Catholic church. On the whole, however, agencies seek to use adoptive couples both of whom
are Catholic." National Conference of Catholic Charities, Adoption Practices in Catholic
Agencies So (1957).
27 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-1-7 (f) (Supp. 1960) (religious, and racial backgrounds
of child and petitioner are to be taken into account) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 45-63 '(Supp.
1961) (the preadoption report should indicate the religion of the child and that of his
natural and adoptive parents) ; D.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-214(4) to -214(5) (1961) (the peti-
tion must state the race and religion of the child or his natural parents, and that of the
petitioner); Ga. Code Ann. § 74-411 (Supp. i961) (suitability of racial and religious
affiliations must be investigated); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3178(545) (e) (Supp. 1959) (pre-
adoption investigation must consider the racial and religious backgrounds of the child and
the petitioner); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 461:2 (Supp. 1961) (preadoption investigation is
to give due regard to the respective race and religion of the child and the petitioner) ; Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.05(e) (Page 1960) (religious and radal backgrounds of child and
petitioner must be investigated prior to the adoption) ; Wash. Rev. Code § 26.32.090 (Supp.
1958) (preadoption investigation report must indicate the religion of the child).
28 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 210, § 5B (1958); N.Y. Coast. art. VI, § 18; N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Law §§ 113, 117; N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 373(3); N.Y.C. Dom. Rel. Ct. Acf § 88;
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-7-12 (1956); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.82(3) (1957).
19621
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"when possible. '29 The important question thus is, what effect do the
courts give to such words? - that is, are these words interpreted as being
mandatory or discretionary?
The New York Court of Appeals interpreted the words "when prac-
ticable" as discretionary in Matter of Maxwell.80 In that case the issue
before the court was whether the New York adoption laws prohibited
the adoption of the Maxwell child, since the religion of the adoptive
parents differed from that of the natural mother. The relevant statute
provided that "in granting orders of adoption ... the court shall, when
practicable . . . give custody only to . . . persons of the same religious
faith as that of the child." 31
Several hours after Mrs. Maxwell's son was born, she signed an
affidavit, prepared by the attorney for the adoptive parents, the Smiths,
in which she gave her consent to the infant's adoption by them. In ad-
dition, she declared that she "does not at the present time embrace any
religious faith." Adoption proceedings were commenced by the Smiths
a few years after Mrs. Maxwell had given her child up for adoption.
During those years the child had been living with the Smiths. At the
adoption proceedings, Mrs. Maxwell stated that she embraced the
Catholic faith, and that she had not known that the persons to whom
the baby had been given were Protestants. She further testified that her
affidavit declaring that she did not embrace any religious faith had been
signed without knowledge of its contents. On these grounds Mrs. Max-
well demanded return of the child and further demanded that, in any
event, the child be brought up in the Catholic faith.
The trial court denied Mrs. Maxwell's petition and granted the adop-
tion.2 On appeal Judge Fuld, writing for the majority, affirmed the
lower court's decision. He found the language of the statute, directing
the court, when practicable, to give custody only to persons of the same
religious faith as that of the child to be discretionary. He said:
The statute calls upon the court to give custody to persons of the same religious
faith as that of the child when practicable. That term is of broad content,
necessarily designed to accord the trial judge a discretion to approve as adoptive
29 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8.236 (1956); ]11. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, § 9-1.15 (1961); Md. Ann.
Code art. 16, § 67 (1957); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 1(d) (Supp. 1961).
30 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958).
31 N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 373(3).
32 The Smiths agreed, however, to have the child baptized in the Catholic faith and
educated in Catholic parochial schools. 4 N.Y.2d at 433, 151 N.E.2d at 850-51, 176 N.Y.S.2d
at 284.
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parents persons of a different faith from the child's in exceptional situations.
Had the legislature intended that in every case the child be adopted by persons
of its own religious faith, it obviously would have made its design known by
language far different from that which it used. The presence in the statute of
the words "when practicable" was to enable the court to relax the requirement
in the unusual case such as the one before us. 3
Judge Desmond dissented, urging that the words "when practicable"
were not discretionary, as indicated by the majority, but mandatory. He
criticized the failure to make efforts to find adoptive parents of the
same religious faith as the child, declaring "it is inconceivable that in
the city of Buffalo such persons could not be found.""a4 However the dis-
sent seems to miss the main thrust of Judge Fuld's opinion. It is not
that other couples could not be found, but that the child had been
living with the Smiths for over four years, and that to place him with
some other couple, or in an institution, would have had serious con-
sequences so far as his well-being was concerned. Thus, the court stated:
The statute may not be employed as a means of wiping out a relationship be-
tween foster parents and child which originated in good faith and has continued
for the entire four and a half years of the youngster's life .... [T]o tear the child
from the love and care of these petitioners, the only mother and father he has
ever known, and send him instead to an institution until other parents are
found, would be inordinately cruel and harsh. No law requires consequences so
distressing.35
Although with Matter of Maxwell it seems that New York has taken
its place with the majority of jurisdictions"s in interpreting the religious
requirements of adoption statutes liberally where the child's welfare is
concerned, some jurisdictions take a more rigid position. Thus, the
Massachusetts court, in Petition of Goldman,37 construed a statute38
similar to that interpreted in Maxwell as being mandatory.
In the Goldman case, a Jewish woman wished to adopt twins born
illegitimately to a Catholic woman. The twins had been in the custody
of the petitioners since they were two weeks old. The natural mother
33 Id. at 434, 151 N.E.2d at 850-51, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
34 Id. at 440, 151 N.E.2d at 854, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
35 Id. at 434-35, 151 N.E.2d at 851, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 284-85.
36 E.g., Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Il. 2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957), reversing 8 Il. App.
2d 269, 130 N.E.2d 678 (1955); In re Adoption of Kure, 197 Minn. 234, 266 N.W. 746
(1936); In re Adoption of Duren, 355 Mo. 1222, 200 S.W.2d 343 (1947); Butcher's Estate,
266 Pa. 479, 109 Ad. 683 (1920).
37 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1994), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942 (1955).
3 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 210, § SB (1958).
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consented to the adoption and also agreed to the twins' being brought
up in the Jewish faith. The judge of the probate court found that the
petitioners were qualified as adoptive parents in all respects, save that
they were not of the same religious affiliation as the natural mother of
the children. But he reasoned that since there were many Catholic couples
in the area who could furnish the twins a good home, it was "practicable"
within the meaning of the Massachusetts provision to give custody of
the children to persons of their own religious faith. The Supreme judicial
Court of Massachusetts affirmed the lower court's decision, applying the
test urged by the dissent in Maxwell - the availability of other couples
of suitable religion to adopt the children. In so doing it seems that the
court broadly interpreted the phrase, "when practicable," to mean
"whenever it is possible to procure."3 9
The constitutionality of such "religious protection" provisions has
been widely discussed."' Regarding this issue of the constitutionality of
the Massachusetts religious protection provision, the court said in the
Goldman case: "All religions are treated alike. There is no 'subordina-
tion' of one sect to another. No burden is placed upon anyone for main-
tenance of any religion. No exercise of religion is required, prevented, or
hampered."41 However, one author questions the decision in Goldman
on a number of constitutional issues, including the validity of the statu-
tory provision itself.42 And another in discussing the New York statute
involved in Maxwell, believed that this provision, if given Judge Des-
mond's dissenting interpretation, would violate in spirit, at least, both the
state guarantees of religious liberty and the first amendment.43
Regardless of what conclusion might be reached on the constitutionality
of the interpretation advocated by Judge Desmond and the Goldman
court, the one practical conclusion which is suggested by a reading
of these two cases is that in both the whole religious problem arose out
39 Cf. Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceedings,
34 B.U.L. Rev., 649, 657 (1959). This is how the Rhode Island statute is meant to be inter-
preted. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-7-13 (1956) provides: "The word 'when practicable' as
used in reference to adoptions shall be interpreted as being without force or effect if there
is a proper or suitable person of the same religious faith or persuasion as that of the child
available to whom orders of adoption may be granted."
40 See Ramsey, supra note 39, at 680-84; Comment, Religion as a Factor in Proceedings
for Adoption and Custody of Children, 1957 U. Ill. L.F. 114; Note, Constitutionality of
Mandatory Religious Requirements in Child Care, 64 Yale LJ. 772 (1955).
41 331 Mass. at 652, 121 NXE.2d at 846.
42 Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U.L. Rev. 333, 377-93 (1955).
43 Ramsey, supra note 39, at 653 n.10.
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of the fact that each was a private placement. Thus, in each the problem
could and should have been avoided by initial resort to a licensed agency
for placement of the child. These cases illustrate the great pitfalls of
private placements for the unprotected natural and/or adoptive parents.
The hardship that can result for either set of parents is immense. What-
ever the merits of either position on the "religious protection" provisions,
the fact of the matter is that situations such as Goldman and -Maxwell
can be avoided if the position of the Model Adoption Act is accepted
and agency placement is made a prerequisite to the adoption proceeding.
RACIAL BACKGROUND
Another area in which the framers of the Model Adoption Act have
seemingly deferred to the present practice in each of the states is that
concerning the question of the racial relationship between the adopted
child and the adoptive parents. In answer to this question the Child Wel-
fare League of America has stated that racial background in itself should
not be the major criterion in the selection of a home for a child. Its
position is:
It should not be assumed that difficulties will necessarily arise if adoptive parents
and children are of different racial origin. At the present time, however, children
placed in adoptive families with similar racial characteristics, such as color, can
become more easily integrated into the average family group and community.44
Some state statutes, while not barring interracial adoptions, do provide
for the placing of the identity of the races of the natural parents, the
child, and the adoptive parents on the adoption petition.45 The effect to
be given this information was in issue in the case of In re Adoption of a
Minor,46 decided under the applicable provision of the District of
Columbia Code. In that case the petition for adoption was filed by the
child's natural mother and his stepfather. Both the child and his mother
were white, but his stepfather was a Negro. The district court denied the
adoption petition, with Judge Holtzoff reasoning that "the boy when he
grows up might lose the social status of a white man by reason of the
44 Child Welfare League of America, op. cit. supra note 26, at 24.
45 See statutes cited note 27 supra.
40 97 U.S. App. D.C. 99, 228 F.2d 446 (1956).
47 The petition or the exhibits annexed thereto shall contain the following information:
(4) The race and religion of the adoptee, or his natural parent or parents.
(5) The race and religion of the petitioner.
D.C. Code Ann. § 16-214(4) (1961).
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fact that by record his father will be a negro if this adoption is ap-
proved.14
8
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, holding
that while a difference in race or religion may have relevance in adoption
proceedings, that factor alone cannot be decisive; the child's welfare
must be paramount. Judge Bazelon, speaking for the court, reasoned
that since the child was happy living in the home of his mother and his
stepfather, and since he would continue to live in that home anyway
(because his mother had custody of him), denying the adoption would
"conly serve the harsh and unjust end of depriving the child of a legitima-
tized status in that home."49
To be contrasted with this liberal view is the unusual approach of
the Louisiana and Texas statutes"0 which prohibit interracial adoptions
altogether. However, such statutes are subject to serious attack on the
constitutional grounds that they violate the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.5 ' A constitutional question could also arise under
the full faith and credit clause if a jurisdiction refused, on the grounds of
local policy prohibiting interracial adoptions, to recognize the status of an
adopted child under a foreign adoption decree.52 Besides the questionable
48 97 U.S. App. D.C. at 100, 228 F.2d at 447.
49 Id. at 101, 228 F.2d at 448.
50 La. Rev. Stat. § 9.422 (1950) ("A single person over the age of twenty-one years, or
a married couple jointly, may petition to adopt any child of his or their race.") ; Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 46a, § 8 (1959) ("No white child can be adopted by a negro person,
nor can a negro child be adopted by a white person.") For a discussion of the Louisiana
Provision see Wadlington, Adoption of Persons Under Seventeen in Louisiana, 36 Tul. L.
Rev. 201, 205-09 (1962).
51 Cf. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) wherein California's anti-
miscegenation statute was held violative of the equal protection clause.
52 See In re Estate of Morris, 56 Cal. App. 2d 715, 133 P.2d 452 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943).
That case involved the issue of whether California would recognize a Rhode Island adop-
tion. In Rhode Island, where it was legal, John F. Morris, a 92-year-old unmarried man,
adopted his 61-year-old niece as his child. California law authorized only the adoption of
minor children. Basing its result mainly on the decisions in Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287 (1942) and Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), the California court held
that:
[W]hen the State of Rhode Island, acting in accord with its laws, established through
valid adoption proceedings the status of adopted child and adoptive parent between
decedent herein and her uncle, full faith and credit must be given to such decree and
the status thereby created must be recognized by the State of California, notwithstand-
ing a claimed conflict with the announced policy of the latter state.
56 Cal. App. 2d at 723, 133 P.2d at 456. As to the important distinction between the power
of a foreign jurisdiction to create a status which under rules of comity and the full faith
and credit clause of the federal constitution must in some instances be recognized by the
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legality of the Texas and Louisiana statutes and the policy they enunciate,
the wisdom of the rigidity of their position is, at best, suspect. Since, as
has been emphasized, the adoption process is replete with social con-
siderations, it seems that before reaching any decision, all of these
considerations should be weighed. To attribute such weight to any one
factor that it precludes all consideration of the others could conceivably
so tie the hands of the court in certain instances as to prevent the achieve-
ment of the most practical and equitable result.
III
PARENTAL CONSENT TO ADOPTION
In discussing the requirement of parental consent to adoption, the
first thing to be noted is the formality which statutes generally require
for such consent to be effective. The Model Adoption Act generally re-
quires written consent to an adoption by the natural parents of the
child. Such consent must be acknowledged before an officer authorized
to take acknowledgments and must be witnessed by a representative of
a child placement agency or of the court53 - a position substantially
reflecting that taken by the Uniform Adoption Act54 and many other
statutes.55 These requirements of acknowledgment and attestation are
designed to ensure that the natural parents are aware of the importance
of the act of consenting; the belief is that such formalities will probably
help deter the natural parents from making a hasty and improvident
decision, and will protect them from fraud, coercion, and overreaching.
An additional safeguard for the rights of the natural parents is found in
the Model Adoption Act's provision requiring that the consent of the
parents or guardian of the person of a minor parent must accompany
the consent of the minor parent to the adoption.56 In this respect the
Model Act differs from the statutes found in the District of Columbia5 7
local forum, and the lack of power of a foreign jurisdiction to attach to the status incidents
which are repugnant to the laws or policy of the local forum, see Tsilidis v. Pedakis, 132
So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). As to the recognition of the adoptive status created by
a foreign decree, see Taintor, Adoption in the Conflict of Laws, 15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 222,
251-66 (1954); Baade, Interstate and Foreign Adoptions in North Carolina, 40 N.C.L. Rev.
691, 705-06 (1962).
53 MAA § 8(b).
54 Uniform Adoption Act § S.
55 E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 72-14 (Supp. 1961), McKinney v. Weeks, 130 So. 2d 310 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (consent held invalid because only one witness was present).
56 MAA § 8(a).
57 D.C. Code Ann. § 16-213(c) (1961).
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and in several states,58 which state that minority is not a bar to consent.
Aside from those cases where the natural parents consent to the adop-
tion, many jurisdictions recognize certain other situations where the
adoption will be allowed without the consent of the natural parents.
Traditionally, these situations dispensing with the consent requirement
have been the following: (1) When the parents, or one of them, have lost
parental rights through voluntary relinquishment or involuntary termi-
nation by court proceedings; (2) when the child has been abandoned;
(3) when the parent is mentally disabled; (4) when the parents are
divorced (with certain important qualifications); and (5) when the child
is illegitimate, in which case one parent's consent may be unnecessary."
The Model Adoption Act does not itself include these traditional
grounds for dispensing with the consent requirement. This is because it
assumes that there has been a proceeding to terminate parental rights in
the child prior to the filing of the adoption petition and these situations
are embodied in the Model Termination Act, as grounds for the involun-
tary termination of the rights of the natural parents.60 However, since the
Model Adoption Act and the Model Termination Act are companion
statutes, designed to be enacted together, it is apparent that the drafters
of the Model Adoption Act intended to preserve the traditional grounds
for dispensing with the consent requirement.
WHEN THE CHILD HAS BEEN ABANDONED
The courts have defined "abandonment" variously as conduct of the
natural parents renouncing the parental relationship,61 or as a "refusal
to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support," '2 or
as a withholding of love, care, and the opportunity to display filial af-
58 E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-103B (1956); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 59-2102 (Supp.
1961); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 74 (1957).
59 Other grounds include failure to support, maintain or care for the child, neglect,
habitual drunkenness or intemperance, general unfitness, desertion, and sentence to im-
prisonment. See Comment, A Compilation of Consent Provisions of Adoption Statutes, 24
Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 359, 362-64 (1952).
60 MTA § 4(b).
61 Abandonment is "any conduct on the part of the parent, which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties, and to relinquish all parental claims to the child."
Winans v. Luppie, 47 NJ. Eq. 302, 304, 20 Atl. 969, 970 (Ct. Err. & App. 1890). This
definition has been endorsed by other jurisdictions: e.g., Davies Adoption Case, 353 Pa.
579, 588, 46 A.2d 252, 257 (1946). Pennsylvania has now adopted the Winans definition by
statute. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 1(a) (Supp. 1961).
62 Matter of Anonymous, 80 N.Y.S.2d 839, 845 (Surr. Ct. 1947). Cases utilizing this or
similar definitions are collected in Note, supra note 19, at 586 n.51.
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fections. It is generally agreed, however, that for such conduct of the
natural parents to constitute abandonment, it must be intentional.64
Usually, the situation which results in a finding of abandonment is one
where the parent leaves his child permanently or indefinitely in the care
of others, making little or no effort to support him. 5 Some statutes also
specify the length of time for which this state of affairs must continue in
order for it to constitute abandonment. 6
Many cases in this area involve fact situations illustrating negative
attitudes toward parenthood, manifested in attempts to "give up" a
child. In the Maxwell case, in discussing the issue of abandonment
arising from Mrs. Maxwell's relinquishment of responsibility for the
welfare of her child, Judge Fuld said:
The mother did not, it is true, leave her child on a doorstep, but surely an
abandonment may be established by proof of conduct less drastic than that ....
When the appellant asserted that she did not want the baby and that she
"wanted" to be done with the matter "as quickly as possible," when she did
everything she could do to conceal the child's very birth, and herself hid behind
a false name, and when thereafter she returned to Canada and for almost a
year manifested not the slightest interest in the welfare of the child ... she
was guilty of conduct that amounted to the abandonment found by the courts
below. It was, in short, the appellant's callous disregard for her child, her com-
plete indifference to how he was faring, not her signing of the surrender and
consent document . . .that constituted the abandonment ... 67
The Illinois Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in Stalder v.
Stone,68 where a mother attempted to defeat the adoption of her illegiti-
mate child by the persons with whom she had left him. The record there
03 E.g., Matter of Anonymous, supra note 62, at 845; Matter of Hayford, 109 Misc. 479,
481, 179 N.Y. Supp. 182, 183 (Surr. Ct. 1919).
64 Annot., 35 AJL.R.2d 662, 668 (1954). Since abandonment must be intentional, in-
voluntary separation is generally held insufficient in itself to constitute an abandonment.
E.g., In re Maxwell, 117 Cal. App. 2d 156, 255 P.2d 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (child taken
from parent by order of juvenile court); Welker's Adoption, 50 Pa. D. & C. 573 (Orphans'
Ct. 1944) (father imprisoned).
65 Cases to this effect are collected in Annot., supra note 64, at 678-80. But failure to
support alone is not usually held sufficient to constitute abandonment. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Strickland, 88 Ga. App. 281, 76 S.E.2d 533 (1953); Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180
P.2d 853 (1947); In re Walton, 123 Utah 380, 259 P.2d 881 (19.3); Petition of Rice, 179
Wis. 531, 192 N.W. 56 (1923).
66 E.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.040 (1959) (one year preceding filing of the adoption peti-
tion); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 1.2 (Supp. 1961) (six months); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 46a, § 6 (Supp. 1961) (two years).
67 4 N.Y.2d at 433, 151 N.E.2d at 850, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 283-84.
68 412 nl. 488, 107 N.E.2d 696 (1952).
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indicated that the mother had attempted unsuccessfully to abort the
child; that when he was born she had lied about his identity and had
placed him with her sister; and that she had later removed him and
placed him with others, still not disclosing his true identity and visiting
him only infrequently. It was held that since she had abandoned the
child, her consent to the adoption was unnecessary. The court caustically
observed that the mother's "entire contact with the child [was] charac-
terized by efforts to get rid of him. 019 She had, said the court, "merely
acted as an agent for some unknown parent in finding a refuge for the
child.170
On the other hand, there have been cases where the parent "abandons"
his child, but within a reasonable time thereafter resumes his parental
duties. In these instances the courts have treated the parent's resumption
of his duties toward the child as repentance, revoking or terminating the
abandonment. 7' However, this repentance must be something more than
a mere mental intent; it must be conduct which manifests an intent to
resume parental responsibilities.72
Moreover, it must be noted that the evidence necessary to determine
abandonment must be related to the conduct of the natural parent. The
"best interests of the child" test is not, and should not be, relevant.73 In
spite of this there is language in some of the cases which indicates such
a concern for the "best interests of the child," while professing to decide
the abandonment issue.74 Perhaps, much of this confusion of issues is a
result of the attempt to litigate the abandonment issue in the adoption
proceeding, rather than in a proceeding to terminate parental rights and
69 Id. at 496-97, 107 N.E.2d at 700-01.
70 Id. at 496, 107 N.E.2d at 700.
71 Cases are collected in Annot., supra note 64, 671-72 (1954).
72 See, e.g., In re Kline, 24 Del. Ch. 427, 8 A.2d 05 (Orphans' Ct. 1939); Bair
Adoption Case, 393 Pa. 296, 141 A.2d 873 (1958); Davies Adoption Case, 353 Pa. 579,
42 A.2d 252 (1946).
73 In a recent case, the Pennsylvania court said:
[T]he welfare of the child is not to be considered until abandonment has been estab-
lished or consent proved: Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132; Schwab's
Adoption Case, 355 Pa. 534, 50 A.2d 504. In Susko . . .we stated: "Unlike custody
cases, in adoption proceedings the welfare of the child is not material until either
consent or abandonment . .. has been established." In Schwab . . . we said: "The
welfare of the child, as an element in adoption proceedings, has no relation to the
question of the parent's abandonment."
In re Adoption of Hangartner, 181 A.2d 280, 284 (Pa. 1962).
74 See, e.g., Alston v. Thomas, 161 Md. 617, 620, 158 Ad. 24, 26 (1931); Young
Adoption Case, 395 Pa. 558, 150 A.2d 845 (1959).
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responsibilities prior to the adoption. In this regard the position of the
Children's Bureau that a termination proceeding should antedate the
filing of the adoption petition has the advantage of lessening the op-
portunity for confusion as to the issues being litigated, and thus provides
a certain amount of protection for the rights of the natural parents in
their child.
WHEN THE PARENT IS MENTALLY DISABLED
Forty states and the District of Columbia allow children of the men-
tally-disabled to be adopted without their parent's consent7 5 The reason-
ing underlying the position taken by these jurisdictions is that a person
suffering from mental disease is incapable of giving consent7 6
The constitutionality of such a statutory provision was passed on by
the Illinois Supreme Court, in People ex rel. Nabstedt v. Bargere7 where
the statute" required that the parent must have been mentally ill for a
period of three years, and that two qualified physicians selected by the
court testify that he was not expected to recover in the foreseeable future,
75 Ala. Code tit. 27, § 3 (1958); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 21-3-13 (1949); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 8-103 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 56-106 (1947); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-1-6
(1953) (implied); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-62, -43a (1960) (implied); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 13, § 908 (1953) ; D.C. Code Ann. § 16-213(b) (2) (9) (1961) (implied); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 74-403 (Supp. 1961); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 331-2 (1955); Idaho Code Ann. § 16-1504
(Supp. 1961); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961); Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 3-120 (1950); Iowa Code Ann. § 600.3 (Supp. 1961); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 59.2102
(Supp. 1961); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.500 (1955); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 158, § 37
(1954) (implied); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 74 (1957); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 210,
§ 3 (1958); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 25.235 (1957); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.24 (Supp.
1961); Miss. Code Ann. § 1269-09 (1956); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 453.040 (Supp. 1961);
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 61-205 (Supp. 1961) (implied); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-104
(1960); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 127.040 (1957); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 461:3 (1955); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 22-2-6 (Supp. 1961); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111; N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 48-9 (Supp. 1961); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-11-10 (Supp. 1961); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3107.06 (Page Supp. 1961); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 60.5, .6 (Supp. 1962); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 109.322 (Supp. 1961); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 2 (Supp. 1961); R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 15-7-7 (1956); S.D. Code § 14.0403 (1939); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-108 (Supp.
1962); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 435 (1958); Va. Code Ann. § 63-351 (Supp. 1962); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.32.040 (1961); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4755 (1961); Wyo. Stat. Ann.
9 1-717 (1957).
76 Thus it has been held that, absent a statute to the contrary, there can be no adoption if
the jurisdiction requires the consent of the natural parents and one of them is insane,
since such a parent is incapable of giving consent. Keal v. Rhydderck, 317 Ial. 231, 237-38,
148 N.E. 53, 56 (1925).
77 3 IlI. 2d 511, 121 N.E.2d 781 (1954).
78 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-8(e) (1961).
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before his consent to the adoption of his child could be dispensed with.
The statute further authorized court appointment of a guardian ad litem
to represent the parent and consent to the adoption. The Illinois court
held that due process of law required by the fourteenth amendment was
not denied the parent by such a proceeding, even though the parent's rela-
tives had been given no notice of its pendency. The court further stated
that even though there was a possibility that the parent might be restored
to good health and reason but yet be unable to regain the custody and
companionship of his child, the act was nonetheless constitutional.
In evaluating the decision in the Nabstedt case it would seem that it
represents a fair and reasonable approach to one of the grave problems
which permeate this area, namely, the problem posed by the difficulty of
determining the extent and duration of the natural parent's illness. To
protect the rights of such a parent, it should be required that in order for
the children of the mentally ill to be adopted without their parents' con-
sent, the parental disability must be hopeless or incurable. A finding to
this effect based on competent medical testimony should thus be re-
quired, and some fixed period of disability should be established. These
limitations were met in the Nabstedt case through the testimony of
court-appointed physicians and the statutory provision fixing the period
of disability at three years. This approach is also followed elsewhere.
Thus, Nevada requires that the natural parents' mental illness has
continued for a two-year period in order for their consent to their child's
adoption to be dispensed with.7 9
In 'opposition to the above views, some states 0 do not require an in-
curable affliction before dispensing with the consent of the mentally
disabled parent. Such a position, however, seems to ignore the important
advances that have been made in the field of psychiatry during recent
years. With new drugs, new methods of therapy and additional trained
personnel in mental hospitals, mental illness is no longer necessarily a
hopeless affliction. Admittedly, it is neither reasonable nor fair to an
adoptable child to put him in an institution, in the temporary custody of
relatives, or in foster care pending his parents' recovery from mental ill-
ness, which recovery might never occur. On the other hand, it is equally
unfair to a parent to give a court the power to take his child away from
him when he might regain his health within a reasonable period of time.
It is submitted that, on balance, the incurable affliction requirement con-
79 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 127.040(2) (Supp. 1959).
80 E.g., Ala. Code tit. 27, § 3 (1958); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.500 (1955); Miss. Code
Ann. § 1269-09 (1956); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-108 (Supp. 1962).
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tained in such statutes as the one in forc4 in Illinois represents a workable
and just arrangement for the safeguarding of the respective interests of
both parents and child.
The Nabstedt case also illustratbs another needed protection for the
natural parent, namely, the appointment of a guardian, guardian ad litem,
or next friend who acts for the parent to give or withhold consent.3 1 Only
with such a provision is the mentally ill parent assured of proper repre-
sentation in the termination or adoption proceedings. Without such a
provision all other protective statutes, such as the incurable affliction re-
quirement, could be rendered meaningless.
In its study of the mentally disabled and the law, the American Bar
Foundation questions the protection which adoption proceedings afford
natural parents afflicted with mental illness. It calls for court-appointed
counsel as one of several approaches to the problem . 2 However, this is a
partial solution at best; for, as indicated previously, more than one
party's interest is involved here. Protection must be afforded not to
the rights of the natural parents only, but to those of the child as well. An
answer can be found only in weighing and balancing these respective in-
terests, in affording the maximum reasonable safeguards to the parents
and in bearing ever in mind the welfare of the child.
WHEN THE NATURAL PARENTS ARE DIVORCED
In general, there are four types of cases in which 'there arises the issue
of whether or not the consent of a divorced natural parent is necessary
for adoption. These are (1) where there has been a valid divorce decree
and one spouse is given custody of the child, subject to visitation rights in
the other spouse; (2) where the divorce decree gives no visitation rights
to one of the spouses or states that absolute care, custody, and control
is in one spouse; (3) where the divorced natfural parent has not visited
the child or has made no effort to support him; (4) where the custody
of the child is given to one parent because of .the other's misconduct and
that misconduct was the basis for the divorce decree.
Under statutes requiring simply that the living parents of a child must
consent to its adoption, 3 the courts have generally held that the consent
of a natural parent who has been divorced and deprived of the custody
81 See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 3107.06 (Page Supp. 1961) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 15-7-7 (1956); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-717
(1957).
82 Lindman & McIntyre, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 206 (1961).
83 E.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 46a, § 6 (Supp. 1961).
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of his child may not be dispensed with.14 In some states, however, statutes
provide that the consent of such a parent is not required;85 but it has
been held that even where statute makes his consent unnecessary, he
must nonetheless be given notice of the adoption proceedings and an
opportunity to make known his objections.86
Some jurisdictions decide the consent issue with regard to divorced
natural parents by looking to the grounds upon which the divorce decree
was granted. Thus, in New York the consent of a parent is unnecessary
when he or she has been divorced on the grounds of adultery and de-
prived of the custody of his child . 7 Another jurisdiction has a similar
statutory provision with regard to cruelty as the basis for divorce.,8
However, where the offending spouse has visitation rights, it has been
held in most jurisdictions that this, in and of itself, is sufficient to make
his or her consent a prerequisite to a valid adoption.89 This position is
based upon the courts' reasoning that statutes dispensing with the consent
of one of the natural parents when custody is in the other natural parent
apply only if the latter has absolute custody over the child, and that any
notion of absolute custody in one of the parents is inconsistent with the
right of visitation in the other." In Iowa, however, even though a spouse
84 E.g., Willis v. Bell, 86 Ark. 473, 111 S.W. 808 (1908); Lucius v. Wistner, 97 N.H. 128,
82 A.2d 602 (1951).
85 E.g., Iowa Code § 600.3 (1962), which provides that where the parents are not
married to each other or where one of them has been deprived of custody by judicial
procedure, only the consent of the parent "having the care and providing for the wants
of the child" is required. In New Mexico, whether the consent of a parent who has been
divorced and deprived of the custody of his child is necessary, is a question for the
discretion of the court. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-6(1) (Supp. 1961).
88 Miller v. Higgins, 14 Cal. App. 156, 111 Pac. 403 (Dist. Ct. App. 1910).
87 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111.
88 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 60.7 (Supp. 1962).
89 McGowan v. Smith, 264 Ala. 303, 87 So. 2d 429 (1956); Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349,
354, 180 P.2d 853, 855-56 (1947); Onsrud v. Lehman, 56 N.M. 289, 243 P.2d 600 (1952);
Stone v. Dickerson, 138 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); In re Force, 113 Wash. 151,
193 Pac. 698 (1920); In re Lease, 99 Wash. 413, 169 Pac. 816 (1918). Contra, Hardesty v.
Hardesty, 150 Kan. 271, 92 P.2d 49 (1939). Some jurisdictions require the divorced parent's
consent if the decree requires him to contribute to the child's support. Bell v. Krauss, 169
Cal. 387, 146 Pac. 874 (1915); Wash. Rev. Code § 26.32.040(2) (Supp. 1958) (divorced
parent's consent is required if the decree grants him visitation rights or requires him to
contribute to the child's support).
90 E.g., Jackson v. Spellman, 55 Nev. 174, 28 P.2d 125 (1934). In that case, the
divorce decree granted the wife "sole custody and control" of the children, with visitation
rights in her husband. In holding the husband's consent necessary, the court stated that
"consent of the guilty spouse can only be dispensed with in a proceeding for adoption ...
had visitation rights, her consent was held to be unnecessary on the theory
that the existence of visitation rights was only one of the factors to be
considered in determining whether or not the consent of the objecting
parent was required.91 Also, when the divorced natural parent has not
exercised his visitation rights or has made no effort to support his child,
thereby evidencing his general lack of interest in the child's welfare,
that parent's consent will be unnecessary in almost all jurisdictions. The
courts tend to treat this situation as an abandonment.92
Unfortunately, in many respects the law in this area is confused and
lacks a reasoned foundation. Natural parents' rights to their children
should be well-protected. What took place in a divorce proceeding may
or may not be relevant in an adoption proceeding. While one spouse
may have been awarded custody of the child in the divorce proceeding,
that should not mean, except in the most unusual circumstances--e.g.,
where the other spouse's conduct would also have served as a basis for
involuntary termination-that this other spouse no longer has any right
to his child, or that he should not be consulted before the child is legally
adopted by another. Circumstances change, and a spouse who may have
been unfaithful during marriage and divorced because of this, should
not necessarily be punished further by being deprived of power to act
when his child is being adopted by another. Thus, the basis for divorce
should not be the criterion for determining whether a spouse's consent
is or is not necessary for an adoption. Secondly, something more should
be required than merely giving the offending spouse notice and an op-
portunity to raise objections. At the very least, the position taken by
Washington, New Mexico, Idaho, and Texas93 in giving the offending
spouse with visitation rights the general right to object to the adoption
of his child, seems to be required if the final decree is to be both fair
and reasonable.
WHEN THE CHILD IS ILLEGITIMATE
Although in some jurisdictions the father's consent is required if he
legitimatizes the child,94 generally, in the case of illegitimate children,
when the custody is awarded to the innocent party without reserving any rights whatever
in the guilty spouse. The custody must be absolute." Id. at 184, 28 P.2d at 129.
91 In re Adoption of Chinn, 238 Iowa 4, 25 N.W.2d 735 (1947); see Hardesty v.
Hardesty, 150 Kan. 271, 273, 92 P.2d 49, 50 (1939). But cf. In re Adoption of Perkins, 242
Iowa 1374, 49 N.W.2d 248 (1951).
92 Cases are collected in Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 824, 847-49 (1956), and Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d
662, 688-91 (1954).
93 See authorities cited note 89 supra.
94 This seems to be the position of the District of Columbia. D.C. Code Ann. § 16-
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the statutes require the consent of the mother only 5 It must be borne
in mind, however, that statutes of the latter type deal with an exception
to the general provision that both of the "living parents" of a child must
consent to that child's adoption.9 Failure to distinguish between the rule
and the exception has led some courts into an erroneous position regarding
the central problem in this area-the situation where a child is legitima-
tized after the then-unmarried mother has given her consent to its adop-
tion.
Some courts profess to find a solution to this problem of whether the
father's consent is then required by applying the "best interests of the
child" test;9 7 but such a view ignores both the statutory law and the real
question which the court is called upon to determine. For, by statute a
parent has a right to object to his child's adoption, and the question for
the court's decision is whether the father of an illegitimate child falls
within the statutory provision requiring consent of both living parents
or whether the above-noted exception is controlling. In other words, the
issue is the rights of the father, rather than the interests of the child.
Still a few cases endorse a strict statutory interpretation of the excep-
tion, reasoning that since it is expressly provided that the consent of the
mother only is sufficient, once her consent is given that of the father
becomes unnecessary. 98 However, it seems clear that the purpose of such
provisions is to deal with those situations where the father is unknown,
and to prevent a father who accepts no responsibility and feels no concern
13(b)(2)(c) (1961) requires the father's consent when "the adoptee has been legitimated
according to the laws of any jurisdiction .... " A similar provision may be found in Wash.
Rev. Code § 26.32.030(2) (Supp. 1958). The Arizona statute, however, provides that the
father's consent is required if he has acknowledged the child. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-
103A(1) (b) (1956). But it would seem that the practical difference between those
statutes using the term "legitimization" and those using the term "acknowledgment" is
greatly minimized by the fact that the usual cases involving the issue of the necessity of the
father's consent are those where there has been both a legitimization of the child by sub-
sequent marriage and acknowledgment of the child by the father. See, e.g., In re Adoption
of Anderson, 189 Minn. 85, 248 N.W. 657 (1933); Sklaroff v. Stevens, 84 R.I. 1, 120 A.2d
694 (1956).
95 E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-5(c) (Supp. 1961); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111(3) ; Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 2(c) (Supp. 1961); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 46a, § 6 (Supp. 1961);
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.32.030(3), .040(5) (Supp. 1958).
96 E.g., N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 111(2); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3107.06(B) (Page Supp.
1961); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 2(c) (Supp. 1961).
97 Ex Parte Combs, 150 N.E.2d 505 (Ohio C.P. 1958); Davis v. Sears, 35 S.W.2d 99
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1931); Adoption of Morrison, 260 Wis. 50, 49 N.W.2d 759 (1951).
98 A. V. B., 217 Ark. 844, 848-49, 233 S.W.2d 629, 632 (1950); see Adoption of a
Minor, 338 Mass. 635, 641-43, 156 N.E.2d 801, 805-06 (1959).
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for his child from capriciously preventing that child's adoption. To apply
such a provision to a case where the child has been legally legitimatized
in good faith is to extend it to a Situation where it was not meant to
apply.
It is submitted that the better reasoning is to be found in those cases
which permit the father's legitimization of his child to operate retro-
actively so that his assent becomes necessary.9 So long as the child
has been legitimatized before the adoption has taken place, it would
seem that the statutory provision requiring the assent of both living
parents to the child's adoption should be controlling. What is important
in this area is the legal relationship between father and child and when
such a relationship has been established by the father's legitimization,
the father's interest in that relationship and his rights in his child should
not be taken from him without his consent.
On the other hand, it also seems that even if the natural mother has
not given previous consent, acknowledgment through intermarriage, alone,
should not make the father's consent indispensable. Nor should merely
supporting the child be sufficient; for, to allow dependency to be the
criterion would be to give a person supporting or generally maintaining
the child more power than he should have, including the power to bar an
adoption-an opportunity that should be afforded to legal parents only.
The important point should be that the father take all the steps necessary
to legally legitimatize the child; the establishment of a legal relationship




Legislatures and courts have assumed a variety of positions with regard
to withdrawal of parental consent to an adoption in the United States.100
At one extreme is the rule that consent, once given, is thereafter ab-
solutely irrevocable, absent fraud or duress.' On the other hand, some
99 E.g., In re Adoption of Anderson, 189 Minn. 85, 248 N.W. 657 (1933); In re Adoption
of Doe, 231 N.C. 1, 56 S.E.2d 8 (1949); Sklaroff v. Stevens, 84 R.I. 1, 120 A.2d 694 (1956);
Harmon v. D'Adamo, 195 Va. 125, 77 S.E.2d 318 (1953).
100 See generally Comment, Revocation of Parental Consent to Adoption: Legal
Doctrine and Social Policy, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 564 (1961). This excellent comment gives a
comprehensive analysis of the case law, statutory provisions and social service attitudes on
the problem of revocation of parental consent.
101 Skeen v. Marx, 105 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); III. Rev. Stat." ch. 4,
§ 9.1-11 (1959).
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of the cases indicate that parental consent is absolutely revocable until
the final decree of adoption is issued.'02 Between these two extremes
is to be found the position of the Model Adoption Act 0 3 and that of
many American jurisdictions'" which regards the question of withdrawal
of consent as one for the discretion of the court.
It seems that the discretionary rule embodied in the Model Adoption
102 See, e.g., In re White, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N.W.2d 579 (1942); State ex rel. Platzer v.
Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435, 183 N.W. 956 (1921); In re Adoption of Anderson, 189 Minn.
85, 248 N.W. 657 (1933). There is a great deal of difference among the jurisdictions as to
when consent becomes absolutely irrevocable. In some, consent becomes irrevocable only
after issuance of the final decree: In re Harvilie, 233 La. 2, 96 So. 2d 20 (1957); Green
v. Paul, 212 La. 338, 31 So. 2d 819 (1947). Still other jurisdictions hold consent revocable
until the adoption hearing: e.g., Stone Adoption Case, 398 Pa. 190, 156 A.2d 808 (1959). In
Michigan, consent is irrevocable after the termination decree. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3178(546)
(Supp. 1959). The North Carolina statute provides that consent becomes irrevocable when
the interlocutory decree is issued unless such consent was given to a director of public
welfare or a licensed child placement agency, in which case it becomes irrevocable 30 days
after it is given; and in any event consent becomes irrevocable six months after it is given.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-11 (Supp. 1961). Tennessee's very unusual statute provides in essence
that consent is irrevocable after the final decree, but absolutely revocable for a period (30 to
90 days) after it was given if no adoption petition is filed in the interim; if such a petition
is filed, consent is revocable in the discretion of the court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-117
(Supp. 1962).
103 MAA § 10 provides:
Withdrawal of any consent filed in connection with a petition for adoption hereunder
shall not be permitted, except that the court after notice and opportunity to be heard
is given to the petitioner in the adoption proceeding, to the person seeking to withdraw
consent and to an authorized agency involved in this proceeding may, if it finds that
the best interest of the child will be furthered thereby, issue a written order permitting
the withdrawal of such consent. The entry of an order of adoption renders any consent
irrevocable.
104 E.g., California-Adoption of Pitcher, 103 Cal. App. 2d 859, 230 P.2d 449 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1951); Connecticut-Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 87 A.2d 388 (1952); Georgia-
Hendrix v. Hunter, 99 Ga. App. 785, 110 S.E.2d 35 (1959); Iowa-In re Adoption of
Cannon, 234 Iowa 828, 53 N.W.2d 877 (1952); Kentucky-Welsh v. Young, 240 S.W.2d 584
(Ky. Ct. App. 1951); Maryland-King v. Shandrowski, 218 Md. 38, 145 A.2d 281 (1958);
New Jersey-In re S., 57 N.J. Super. 154, 154 A.2d 129 (Essex County Ct. 1959); New
York-Matter of Anonymous, 286 App. Div. 161, 143 N.Y.S.2d 90, motion for leave to
appeal denied, 286 App. Div. 968, 146 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1955). It should be noted that while
statutes rarely state whether consent is to be absolutely revocable, irrevocable, or revocable in
the discretion of the court, the courts generally profess to find the basis for the rule they
adopt in the statutes of their jurisdictions. Thus, the District of Columbia and Arizona
courts have interpreted statutes providing that the minority of parents shall not be a bar
to their consenting to adoption as meaning that consent is revocable only in the
discretion of the court. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-103B (1956), In re Holman's Adoption,
80 Ariz. 201, 295 P.2d 372 (1956); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-213(c) (1961), In re Adoption
of a Minor, 79 U.S. App. D.C. 191, 144 F.2d 644 (1944).
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Act represents the modern trend. Only two states, Florida and Illinois,
appear to cling to the rule that consent is absolutely irrevocable.0 5 And
the reasoning with which the older cases buttressed the absolute-right-of-
revocation rule-that parental consent being necessary to an adoption,
withdrawal of such consent before the final decree had "vested" any right
to the child in the adoptive parents deprived the court of jurisdiction to
decree the adoptionl 0 ---is no longer generally followed. 7
In line with this trend the discretionary rule has been expressly adopted
by statute in some jurisdictions. Thus, Minnesota, formerly a leading
jurisdiction in applying the absolute-right-of-revocation rule, 08 has come
to the discretionary rule by statute. 0 9 The Georgia statute similarly pro-
vides that parental consent, once given, "may not be revoked by the
parents as a matter of right.""10 A Maryland statute provides that the
adoption petition may be granted without parental consent if such con-
sent is withheld "contrary to the best interests of the child."'' i A Dela-
ware statute allows the natural parents sixty days after the giving of
consent within which to seek the court's permission to revoke it.I1 And
the Uniform Adoption Act takes the position that consent should be
revocable in the discretion of the court until the interlocutory decree is
issued." 3 In evaluating the merits of these various positions, one can
105 See authorities cited note 101, supra. But some states have statutory provisions to
the general effect that consent is irrevocable where the child has been given up for
adoption to a licensed child placement agency, in accordance with prescribed procedures.
E.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 3107.6 (Page 1954); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 46a, § 6
(Supp. 1961); Wash. Rev. Code § 2632.070(1) (Supp. 1958). Such provisions have gen-
erally been given effect by the courts. E.g., Kozak v. Lutheran Children's Aid Soc'y, 164 Ohio
St. 335, 130 N.E.2d 796 (1955); Catholic Charities v. Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d
111 (1960).
106 See, e.g., In re White, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N.W.2d 579 (1942); State ex rel. Platzer v.
Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435, 183 N.W. 956 (1921).
107 See Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1011 (1945).
208 E.g., In re Adoption of Anderson, 189 Minn. 85, 248 N.W. 657 (1933).
109 Minn. Stat. § 259.24(6) (1957).
110 Ga. Code Ann. § 74-413(1) (Supp. 1961).
I' Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 74 (1957). While the statute refers in terms only to those
cases in which a parent withholds his consent, the Maryland Court of Appeals has ruled
that it also applies where consent is given and then revoked. King v. Shandrowski, 218 Md.
38, 145 A.2d 281 (1958).
112 Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 909 (1953).
113 Uniform Adoption Act § 6. So far as the author has been able to discover, neither
the courts nor the legislatures in Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming have taken a definite position on
this subject.
1962]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
sympathize with the view of some social welfare agencies favoring the
rule which denies revocation altogether, since a great deal of effort goes
into the. placement of a child, and the revocation of parental consent
would disrupt the adoption plan. However, it would also seem that fair-
ness to the natural parents demands a less rigid rule than absolute denial
of any right of revocation. For, parents are the natural custodians of
their children and they should be granted every reasonable opportunity
to maintain what one court has called "the sacred relationship of parent
and child." 114
Finally, it must be remembered that here as in other areas of adoption
law there are three parties involved-the natural parents, the adoptive
parents, and the child-all of whose rights and well-being must be
considered. Of course natural parents should have an opportunity to
maintain their relationship with their child; but to give them the absolute
right to revoke consent at any time, or even within a limited time at
their unrestricted election, would result in uncertainty with regard to
the disposition of the case and the welfare of the child. With the threat
of the natural parents' revocation hanging over the adoptive parents,
placements would be difficult. Adoptive parents would tend to feel in-
secure with regard to the adoption, and this feeling might have a detri-
mental effect in their relationship with their adoptive child. Further,
the adoptive child might suffer as well, as a change in environment after
a child has become settled in his adoptive home might cause serious
psychological problems. Finally, to give the natural parents an unfettered
right of revocation, even for a limited time, could provide them with the
power to choose between contesting sets of adoptive parents; 1 5 this
could conceivably provide an opportunity for them to extort money from
the adoptive parents in return for a promise not to revoke consent." 0
The discretionary rule embodied in the Model Adoption Act has the
advantage of avoiding these dangers posed by the rigidity of the extreme
positions. It permits the court to weigh all of the factors in an adoption
case, and to approve a revocation when the facts of the individual case
warrant it. But like any rule which places great reliance upon judicial
discretion, it has the drawback of furnishing no specific criterion to aid
the court in reaching a decision. The Model Adoption Act attempts to
114 Adoption of McKinzie, 275 S.W.2d 365, 372 (Mo. App. 1955). This case includes a
brief summary of the law on revocation of consent in various jurisdictions.
15 See In re Thompson, 178 Kan. 127, 283 P.2d 493 (1955).
116 See Matter of Anonymous, 286 App. Div. 161, 143 N.Y.S,2d 90, motion for leave to
appeal denied, 286 App. Div. 968, 146 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1955).
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solve the problem by employing the "best interests of the child '" ' 7 cri-
terion. Some decisions in this area have announced such general criteria
as the encouragement of adoption and avoidance of the stigma of il-
legitimacy."" Probably the only satisfactory solution is to ensure that
the judge, in exercising his discretion, has all the information bearing on
the case which he needs to do justice to all of the parties concerned.
V
THE INTERLOCUTORY DECREE PRACTICE AND THE PROCEDURE
UNDER THE MODEL ACTS
Any comparative analysis of the adoption laws of the various states
and the Model Adoption Act would be incomplete without, at least, a brief
discussion of the basic procedural difference between these statutory
schemes. As might be expected, the most fundamental difference in this
regard is that under the latter the procedure is a twofold one, being
separated into the termination proceedings and the adoption proceedings,
while under many statutes the proceeding is unified. Several statutes pro-
vide for the issuance of an interlocutory decree of adoption which gen-
erally culminates in the issuance of a final decree. Some leaders in the
social service field have criticized the Model Adoption Act for its failure
to utilize the interlocutory decree." 9 To them, the interlocutory decree
practice found in nineteen jurisdictions 20 and embodied in the Uniform
17 MAA § 10.
118 See Comment, op. cit. supra note 100, at 571-72.
119 Some criticisms were voiced at the Welfare Conference Group of the Health and
Welfare Council of the National Capital Area meeting in Washington, D.C., March 6, 1962.
One of the leading spokesmen for this group is Mr. Richard B. Barker, of the Barker
Foundation, Washington, D.C. The author acknowledges with gratitude the benefit
gained from discussions and correspondence with Mr. Barker on the interlocutory decree
problem.
120 The following are the jurisdictions utilizing the interlocutory decree procedure
(parentheticals indicate the time which must elapse after the granting of the interlocutory
decree, before the final decree can be granted): Alabama (six months) Ala. Code tit. 27,
§ 4 (1958) ; Arizona (one year) Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-107 (1956) ; Arkansas (six months)
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 56-108 (1948); Colorado (discretionary; one year) Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§,4-1-9(d) (1953) ; Connecticut (not less than twelve nor more than thirteen months) Conn.
Gen. Stat. Rev. § 45-63 (1958); District of Columbia (discretionary; not less than six
months nor more than one year) D.C. Code Ann. § 16-218 (1961) ; Georgia (six months) Ga.
Code Ann. § 714-413 to -414 (Supp. 1961); Illinois -(called "interim order"; six months)
IE. Ann. Stat. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-13 to -14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961); Louisiana (at least six
months) La. Rev. Stat. §§ 429, 432 (Supp. 1961); Maryland (discretionary; one year) Md.
Ann. Code art. 16, § 77 (1957) ; Mississippi (six months, or less under some circumstances)
1962]
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Adoption Act' 2 ' has legal, social and psychological advantages over the
procedures advanced by the Model Adoption Act.
Typically, under the adoption procedure of a jurisdiction such as the
District of Columbia which employs the interlocutory decree practice,
the following steps might occur:
1. A child is born February 1, 1962.
2. The child is removed from the hospital and placed in an agency
foster home on February 5, 1962.
3. A relinquishment of parental rights is taken from the mother on
February 21, 1962 and is filed with the court.
4. A petition for adoption requesting an interlocutory decree is filed
with the court on February 22, 1962.
5. The social report of the agency is filed with the court on Feb-
ruary 28, 1962.
6. An interlocutory decree of adoption is entered by the court on
March 1, 1962. This interlocutory decree of adoption terminates the
parental rights of the natural parents and decrees that from and after
its entry the child shall be deemed to have been born of the adopters.
7. The child enters the adoptive home on March 1, 1962. During the
interim period between February 21 and March 1 the adopting parents
have been advised of the background history of the child, omitting
natural names and places, and have had an opportunity to see the child
and to be with him in the foster home.
8. The interlocutory decree, by its terms, becomes final on August 1,
1962.
While the outcome under the District of Columbia practice and under
the Model Adoption Act with its companion Model Termination Act
may be the same, the method of achieving this outcome differs. As men-
tioned previously the model acts provide a two-step procedure-a pro-
ceeding to terminate the rights of the natural parents in the child, fol-
lowed by the adoption proceeding proper-rather than the one-step
procedure outlined above. The adherents of the interlocutory decree
Miss. Code Ann. §§ 1269-05 to -06 (1956); Montana (six months) Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ 61-211 (Supp. 1962); North Carolina (not earlier than one year) N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 48-17
to -21 (Supp. 1961); Ohio (six months) Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3107.09, .11 (Page 1960);
Oklahoma (six months) Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 60-15 (Supp. 1962); Tennessee (not earlier
than one year; but discretionary under some circumstances) Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-119, -124
(1956); Virginia (six months) Va. Code Ann. §§ 63-352, -356 (Supp. 1962); Washington
(six months) Wash. Rev. Code § 26-32.130(3) (Supp. 1958).
121 Uniform Adoption Act § 11 (six months).
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practice say that this procedure saves the costs of two court proceedings
and the delays necessarily incident to such proceedings.
The interlocutory decree procedure has even more important advan-
tages to offer to the natural parents, the adoptive parents, and the child.
The natural mother, for example, knows at or about the time her re-
linquishment of parental rights occurs that the court has passed on the
legality of the relinquishment and upon the legality of the adoption
petition and the effectiveness of the social report. She can be more at
ease knowing her child will be adopted by parents found satisfactory
through an agency investigation. The delay between the termination of
parental rights and responsibilities and the final adoption decree which
occurs under the model adoption acts is avoided, as is the uncertainty
as to the status of the child during this period between the termination
of parental rights and the conclusion of the adoption proceedings. While
the Model Act's termination decree might bridge this temporal gap by
vesting custody in the adoptive parents and guardianship in a social
welfare agency, this would be something far less than an interlocutory
decree having "the same legal effects as a final decree of adoption."' 22
Moreover, under the model acts the child, too, may be at a disadvan-
tage during this interim between the termination of his parent's rights in
him and issuance of the final decree of adoption. For, to utilize the
previous illustration, a social welfare agency might be appointed legal
guardian of the child while the future adoptive parents would have
custody of him; and in situations where the legal relationship of parent-
child is the criterion rather than dependency, the child might be deprived
of important financial benefits during this period. 123
122 D.C. Code Ann. § 16-222(b) (1961). Thus, the District of Columbia treats the
period during which the interlocutory decree is in effect as something more than a "getting
acquainted" or "trial" period. Contra, In re Clements' Petition, 201 Tenn. 98, 103-04,
296 S.W.2d 875, 878 (1956), where the court said that the purpose of the interlocutory
decree was to provide an opportunity "to see whether or not things will work out for the
child-a kind of trial period, and preliminarily adjudicating everything essential to make
the final adoption if the investigation and final proof is in accord." Id. at 103-04, 296 S.W.2d
at 878.
123 Normally under intestacy laws a child not yet legally adopted would not share in
the estate of his future adoptive parents. But some workmen's compensation statutes place
emphasis on dependency rather than legal relationship in awarding benefits to children.
See 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 141(2)(b) (1958). However, in Varchin v.
District Ct., 133 Minn. 265, 158 N.W. 250 (1916), where the Minnesota Supreme Court was
concerned with the application of the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act to a
child adopted by a widow after her husband's death, the court remarked:
[T]he statute includes all children of the deceased, and other children who have legal
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In reply, it might be argued with much force that the approach of the
model acts, with its two proceedings, reduces the confusion that would
arise if the issue of termination were litigated in the same proceeding as
the adoption. As persuasive as this argument may be, it is suggested
that the above-mentioned advantages inherent in the interlocutory decree
practice would be well worth the consideration of the Children's Bureau.
By utilization of the interlocutory decree practice, it is possible that the
Bureau's carefully drafted and generally excellent suggested legislation
could be materially improved.
CONCLUSION
In the preceding pages, emphasis has been laid on the fact that the
adoption of a child is no longer a simple legal act, but rather a legal
and social process. The development of the "social investigation" and
"adoption study" requirements in the law of adoption, plus recognition
of its social aspects, has brought into the adoption process persons edu-
cated in fields other than law-notably professional social workers,
persons trained in interviewing techniques, understanding human be-
havior, and evaluating family relationships. But because adoption is
both a legal and social process, involving the services of social workers
and the resources of social agencies, as well as the skills of lawyers and
judges, and because an adoption has a certain amount of human interest
so far as the general public is concerned, the real effect of adoption
is sometimes lost sight of. Professional roles are confused,124 and the
identity of the decision maker may be forgotten. 25 Yet it is still a
judge in court who actually decides, not a social worker.
claims to his support and the right to inherit in his estate. This might perhaps include
children of his wife by a former husband, or children taken into the family and
formally adopted by the deceased in his lifetime. But we are of opinion that a child
having no such relationship or status to the deceased does not come within the statute,
and is not entitled to the allowance there provided for.
Id. at 267, 158 N.W. at 251. For the criterion of dependency for receiving death benefits
under the Social Security Act, see 74 Stat. 946, 952 (1960), 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (Supp.
III, 1962), Gonzalez v. Hobby, 110 F. Supp. 893 (D.P.R. 1953). An Alabama health insurance
contract was held to provide protection for children living with the adopting parents during
the period of probation. Blue Cross-Blue Shield v. Kelley, 141 So. 2d 533 (Ala. 1962). A
financial benefit available to the adopting parents during the time in which a child, placed
by an agency for adoption, is living with the parents, is that they can claim the dependency
deduction under the federal income tax laws. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 152(b).
124 For a comparison of the goals of the lawyer and the social worker, see Gallagher,
Interprofessional Teamwork to Safeguard Adoptions, 6 Children 101 (1959); Katz, The
Lawyer and the Caseworker: Some Observations, 42 Social Casework 10 (1961).
125 An interesting account of a disputed adoption originally sponsored by a state public
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It is precisely because adoption remains a legal as well as a social
process, because it is a judge, applying the laws passed by a legislature,
who grants or denies the adoption, that it becomes necessary for legisla-
tors and judges to take into account social and sometimes psychological
considerations in drafting their statutes and in reaching their decisions.
It is this element which makes the Model Adoption Act enlightened
legislation; for this Act recognizes the decision-making role of the judge,
and yet attempts to ensure that in reaching his decision he will consider
the social as well as the legal aspects of adoption, and that he will have
all available information which will aid him in reaching a just disposition
of the case.
A judge, employing the norms embodied in the Model Adoption Act,
will recognize that there are three parties whose interests and feelings
are involved in the adoption process, and that all must be treated fairly.
He will realize that the natural parents must be cautioned, informed,
counselled, and protected; he will realize that the adoptive parents must
likewise be protected, that their reliances and expectations should be
strongly considered. And, after considering the interests of these parties,
when the judge is faced with the final decision in an adoption case, he
will ponder again that ancient question, "Is it well with the child?"
welfare agency but later prevented because changed circumstances convinced officials that
the home was not adequate can be found in Lindford, The Miller Adoption Case, 34 Social
Serv. Rev. 421 (1960). In this article, Dean Lindford traces an adoption from the initial
placement to the appeal of the adoption order to the state supreme court. The case,
based on a real case, though the names of individuals and agencies were disguised in order
to preserve confidentiality, illustrates decision-making on various levels in a social welfare
department and shows the manner in which administrative agencies, law enforcement
officers and the courts work together in the solution of an adoption problem.
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